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NOTE
APPEALABILITY OF CLASS
CERTIFICATION DENIALS AFTER ROPER
AND GERAGHTY: THE FLEXIBLE
CHARACTER OF THE CASE OR
CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT
INTRODUCTION
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before a class suit
may proceed, the trial judge must "certify" the class as such.1 The
IUnder FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c), the trial judge is required to consider the certification of
a class "as soon as practicable" after the filing of suit. Although such consideration is gener-
ally prompted by a plaintiff's motion for class certification, see, e.g., Peritz v. Liberty Loan
Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354-55 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. School Bd. of City of Suffolk,
418 F. Supp. 639, 645-47 (E.D. Va. 1976), some courts have held that certification may be
made without a motion by the plaintiff, see Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511,
520-21 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight
Sys., Inc., 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S.
395 (1977). The plaintiff's failure to move for class certification, however, has been held by
some courts to be evidence of his inadequacy as a class representative. See, e.g., Nance v.
Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Div., 540 F.2d 718, 722-25 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 953 (1977); Forrester v. Vermilye, 78 F.R.D. 68, 70 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Buck-
ner v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 649, 650-51 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Beasely
v. Kroehler Mfg. Co., 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 909, 910-11 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
In considering whether to certify a class, the district court must look to see if the par-
ticular suit satisfies the requirements of rule 23(a), see notes 23-25 and accompanying text
infra, and if the class fits within one of the categories described in rule 23(b). See, e.g.,
Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427-29 (5th Cir. 1971); Hyatt v. United Aircraft
Corp., Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 50 F.R.D. 242, 245-47 (D. Conn. 1970). Although the district
court generally is not required to make findings regarding its decision as to certification, it
may do so if there are substantive controversies regarding the certification. See Interpace
Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 438 F.2d 401, 404 (3d Cir. 1971). Recognized to be discretion-
ary in nature, see Berman v. New Hampshire Jockey Club., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 993, 999-1000
(D. N.H. 1968), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n,
Inc., 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Baxter v. Savannah
Sugar Ref. Corp., 46 F.R.D. 56, 59 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am.
Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1968), the determination of class certification may
be reversed or amended during the course of the litigation, see, e.g., Lamphere v. Brown
Univ., 553 F.2d 714, 718-19 (1st Cir. 1977); Guerine v. J & W Inv., Inc., 544 F.2d 863, 864-65
(5th Cir. 1977); Gerstly v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 466 F.2d 1374, 1375-78 (10th Cir. 1972);
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effect of the certification, the Supreme Court has noted, is to im-
bue the class with "a legal status separate from the interests" as-
serted by the named plaintiffs. Where class certification is denied,
however, the maintenance of the action as a class suit-fre-
quently the only economically feasible means of seeking redress-
depends on the availability of an effective right of appeal. The ex-
istence of such right of appeal generally requires the satisfaction of
two conditions. The first, imposed by statute, as a general rule
mandates that the appeal be taken only from a "final decision. ' '3
At one time this requirement was liberally construed, thus permit-
ting appeals from certification rulings which had the practical eco-
nomic effect of terminating the litigation, notwithstanding that
such rulings generally were not final in the literal sense.4 The Su-
preme Court, however, rejected this attempt to circumvent the
finality requirement in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,5 holding
that no interlocutory appeal lies as of right from an adverse certifi-
cation ruling.8
The second condition to obtaining appellate review of a certifi-
cation denial, one of constitutional dimension, is that the party
pursuing the appeal must possess a personal stake in the outcome
Sley v. Jamaica Water & Utils. Inc., 77 F.R.D. 391, 394 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975). See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 129-30
(1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 752-57 (1976).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) states in pertinent part: "The courts of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions." The Supreme Court has interpreted the
statute to mean that finality is a prerequisite to appellate review in the absence of a statu-
tory or common-law exception. See Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963);
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S 323, 324 (1940). The policy underlying finality is to
"avoid the mischief of economic waste and of delayed justice," Radio Station WOW, Inc. v.
Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945), as well as "prevent[ing] the debilitating effect on judicial
administration caused by piecemeal appeal disposition of what is in practical consequence,
but a single controversy." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974). Some
commentators, however, have suggested that a more flexible approach to appealability than
that provided by the current judicial interpretation of finality is needed. See Radish, The
Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89 (1975);
Note, Proposals for Interlocutory Appeals, 58 YALE L.J. 1186 (1949). For a discussion of
some of the more important exceptions to finality, see notes 35-83 and accompanying text
infra.
' In Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964), the Supreme Court
stated that the finality requirement should be given "a practical rather than a technical
construction." Id. at 152. Relying on this statement, the Second Circuit, in Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), held that when the denial of the class suit sounded
the "death knell" of the suit, it was in practical terms a final order and was appealable as of
right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 370 F.2d at 121. See notes 35-51 and accompanying text infra.
6 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
0 Id. at 477. See notes 52-61 and accompanying text infra.
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of the litigation.7 The effect of this requirement on the continua-
tion of a class action once certified has been the subject of several
Supreme Court decisions in recent years.' Indeed, the Court has
noted that once certified, the interest of the class is sufficient to
justify the continuation of the action, notwithstanding that the
named plaintiff-the putative class representative-has individu-
ally lost the stake in the outcome requisite to satisfy the case or
controversy requirement." Moreover, the Court has also suggested
that when the named plaintiff's individual claim has become moot
before the trial court has ruled on the motion to certify, which mo-
tion it subsequently grants, the certification may be found to relate
back to the filing of the complaint so as to establish the existence
of the case or controversy necessary to continue the action.10 Until
7 The personal stake requirement necessary to establish standing derives from article
I of the United States Constitution which limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
"cases" and "controversies." U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 2. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498-502 (1975); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 496 n.7 (1969); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-21 (1960). The case or
controversy requirement limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to suits brought "in an
adversary context and in a form capable of judicial resolution." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
101 (1968). Since the extent of the case or controversy requirement is not readily definable,
see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), the Supreme Court has
had great flexibility in defining the limits of justiciability in each particular case. See L.
TRmE, AMERicAN CONSTrruoNA LAw §§ 3-8 (1978). In interpreting such limits, however,
the courts are precluded by article III from considering non-adversarial matters, such as
advisory opinions. See Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945).
The restriction on advisory opinions is designed to maintain the separation of powers, since
advisory functions are duties restricted to the executive and legislative branches. See United
States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 147 (1961); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.2
(1792). In meeting the adversarial requirement, the plaintiff must possess a personal stake
in the controversy. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). In Baker, the Supreme Court noted that the personal stake requirement was
designed "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination ...... Id. at 204. See, e.g., Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). Whether the requisite personal stake exists is a
frequently litigated issue in public interest suits. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
oF ADMIISTRATVE ACTION 459-500 (1963); Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It
a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
' See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Rich-
ardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
9 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 393, 402 (1975). See note 132 infra. See generally
Champlin, Personal Stake and Justiciability: Application to the Moot Class Action, 27
KAN. L. REv. 85 (1978); Kane, Standing, Mootness and Federal Rule 23-Balancing Per-
spectives, 26 BUFFALO L. Rav. 83 (1976); Comment, Continuation and Representation of
Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573 (1974).
"0 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.11 (1975). See note 132 and accompanying text
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recently, however, a conflict existed among the circuits on the issue
of whether the mootness of the named plaintiff's individual claim
subsequent to the denial of certification would preclude him from
seeking review of the certification ruling.11 In the companion cases,
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper 2 and United States
Parole Commission v. Geraghty,"s however, the Supreme Court re-
solved the controversy holding that at least in certain instances,
the mootness in whole or in part of the putative class representa-
tive's claim did not deprive him of the personal stake in the out-
come of the litigation requisite to appealing the certification
ruling.1 4
In light of the recent developments both in the interpretation
of finality and the effect of the mootness of the named plaintiff's
individual claim, this Note will explore the current availability of
an effective right of appeal for would-be class representatives who
have been denied class certification in federal court. First, the de-
velopment of the class action, the requirement of certification, and
the right of appeal from certification determinations will be
traced.1" Then, after identifying certain problems that have arisen
infra.
11 The federal courts of appeals have differed as to the viability of the putative class
suit when the named plaintiff's individual claim expires prior to certification. Some courts
had held that once the named plaintiff's claim was rendered moot, then the putative class
suit must be dismissed for lack of a live case or controversy. See Vun Cannon v. Breed, 565
F.2d 1096, 1098-1101 (9th Cir. 1977); Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271,
276-77 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); Kuahulu v. Employers Ins. of
Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Boyd v. Justices of Special
Term, 546 F.2d 526, 527 (2d Cir. 1976); Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825, 826-28 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977). Other courts, however, have allowed class suits to
continue notwithstanding the mootness of the plaintiff's claim. See Susman v. Lincoln
American Corp., 587 F.2d 866, 868-71 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 940 (1980);
Roper v. Consurve, 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank
v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); cf. Armour v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 46, 48-49 (5th Cir.
1979), vacated, 445 U.S. 940 (1980); Camper v. Calumet Petrochemicals, Inc., 584 F.2d 70,
71-72 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (where named plaintiff's claim found meritless, class suit
dismissed unless plaintiff has "nexus" with putative class). But cf. Goodman v. Schlesinger,
584 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1978) (dismissal of named plaintiff's claim on the merits held not to
require dismissal of class claim until after reasonable time for intervention by proper plain-
tiff has passed).
12 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
" 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
14 United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980); Deposit Guar.
Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 340 (1980). See notes 94-136 and accompanying text
infra.
" See notes 19-34 and accompanying text infra.
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regarding the appealability of a denial of class certification, 6 an
analysis will be made of recent cases which have relaxed the article
III case or controversy requirements thereby facilitating the appeal
of some certification rulings.1" Finally, this Note will suggest that
although these most recent decisions have ameliorated some of the
problems involved in appealing certification rulings, they neverthe-
less have not secured for the aggrieved putative class representa-
tive a meaningful right of appeal from adverse certification
determinations.18
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLASS ACTION AND THE CERTIFICATION
PROCEDURE
The class suit device, which originated in order to circumvent
the stringency of common-law joinder requirements, 9 allows suit
to be brought by a representative who asserts not only his own
claim, but also the rights of the class as a whole. 20 Thus, the class
suit makes possible the avoidance of much of the cost, effort, and
time that would have been required to litigate each claim individu-
ally.21 Although the class action first was promulgated by the
courts of equity,22 representative suit today generally is authorized
16 See notes 35-92 and accompanying text infra.
17 See notes 93-136 and accompanying text infra.
18 See notes 137-150 and accompanying text infra.
" F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIViL PROCEDURE 500 (1977); see Note, Developments in the
Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HAnv. L. REV. 874, 928-29 (1958).
See generally 1 H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS § 1004 (1977).
2' The class representative is, in effect, a "private attorney general," litigating on behalf
of an aggrieved class. See Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700-05 (2d Cir. 1943). As
such, the class suit has been called "a cross between administrative action and private litiga-
tion." Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); see Homburger, Private
Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of America, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 343, 375-
79 (1974); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L.
REv. 684, 717 (1941).
21 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972); Amalgamated Workers
Union v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 478 F.2d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 1973); Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948). See generally H. NEWBERG, supra note
19, § 1000a; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1758 (1972);
Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARv. L. REV.
589, 589 (1974).
22 See System Fed'n. No. 91 v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991, 995 (6th Cir. 1950). The class action
originated in the English Court of Chancery, where the bill of peace was used to permit suit
by an individual on behalf of an entire group. See Z. CHAFEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES
200-13 (1938); W. WALSH, EQUITY § 118, at 553-60 (1930); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 21, § 1751 at 504. See generally Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (VII):
Creditor's Bills, 5 HARv. L. REv. 101, 109, 128 (1891).
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by statute. For federal cases, rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is controlling.2 3 Originally adopted in 193824 and sub-
23 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class ac-
tion if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any Htiga-
tion concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will
exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specific date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion;
and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an
appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to
APPEAL OF CERTIFICATION DENIALS
stantially revised in 1966,25 rule 23 sets forth the prerequisites to
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided
in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and
whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into sub-
classes and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall
then be construed and applied accordingly.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b), (c). This rule, which allows wide discretion to the trial judges in
permitting class suits, was intended to promote availability of class actions. See Amend-
ments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 100, 102, 104 (1966). Thus, rule 23 is to be
given a liberal, rather than restrictive interpretation. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d
555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968); Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1966); accord, Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc.,
326 F. Supp. 98, 102 (D. Colo. 1971).
24 As originally enacted, rule 23 came under scholarly attack. See Kalven & Rosenfield,
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, supra note 20, at 684 (1941); Simeone, Pro-
cedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MIcH. L. Rv. 905 (1962). But see Van Dercreek, The
"Is" and "Ought" of Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23,48 IowA L. REv. 273 (1963). One
source of criticism was the failure of the rule to address the binding effect of a class action
judgment on the absent members. See Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction
and Effect of Judgment, 32 IL. L. REv. 555, 556 (1938) (advisory committee on the federal
rules believed that matter of binding effect was substantive and, hence, not a proper subject
for treatment in procedural rules). At the root of this criticism was the adoption by the 1938
rule of a tripartite classification. Under this classification, rule 23 required that all class
actions be categorized into one of three categories. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 21, § 1752. These classifications came to be known as the "true," "hybrid," and "spuri-
ous" class suits. Id. Proper categorization was very important to the class action litigant
since many courts came to determine the question of the binding effect of the class judg-
ment on the basis of which category of class suit was involved. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
supra note 19, at 503; see Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action
Judgments, supra note 21, at 591-92. Another criticism of the 1938 rule was its failure to
provide adequate assurance of procedural fairness. See Note, Developments in the
Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HAav. L. REv. 874, 937-38 (1958);
Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 818, 822-
33 (1946).
215 In amending rule 23 in 1966, the Supreme Court attempted to remedy difficulties
that existed with the 1938 rule, see note 24 supra, by taking a more practical approach in
outlining the requirements for a class action. See Wright, Recent Changes in the Federal
Rules of Procedure, 42 F.R.D. 552, 563-67 (1966); Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class
Actions: Surviving Difficulties and New Problems Require Further Amendments, 52 MhNN.
L. REv. 509, 509-10 (1967). But see Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58
F.R.D. 313, 334 (1973) (notice requirement is best left to discretion of the district court). In
addition to abolishing the tripartite categorization of the 1938 rule, see note 24 supra, the
1966 amendments added sections (c)(2) and (d) to rule 23. Rule 23(c)(2) requires that in an
action for damages, once the class is certified, notice be sent to all potential class members
and if the members do not want to be considered part of the class, then they can ask to be
excluded from the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Rule 23(d) provides the district court with
flexibility to conduct the class suit by permitting the court to "make appropriate orders."
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d). This section was added to encourage the judiciary to take a more
active role to ensure that the absent class was properly represented. See generally Newberg,
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:277
maintenance of a class suit26 and the procedure to be used by the
trial court to determine whether the purported class will be certi-
fied .2  Before the trial court will certify the class, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that all of the requirements of rule 23 are met.28
Thus, in carrying this burden of proof, the would-be class repre-
sentative must show *among other things that joinder of all mem-
bers of the class is impracticable because of the class size, that the
case presents questions of law or fact which are common to the
class, and that he will adequately and fairly represent the absent
class members.29 Once the class is certified, the separate legal sta-
tus which it acquires 0 triggers significant procedural conse-
quences."1
Significantly, denial by the trial court of certification means
only that the plaintiff may not bring suit as a representative; he
may continue, of course, with his individual cause of action. Never-
theless, it has been recognized that the decision whether a claim
may proceed as a class action may also be determinative of the
Orders in the Conduct of Class Actions: A Consideration of Subdivision (d), 10 B.C. IND. &
CoM. L. REv. 577 (1969).
26 FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(a), (b).
"' FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(1). See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 21, at § 1785. In
a suit for damages, the determination of class certification should be made prior to adjudica-
tion of the merits, Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1975), but
this determination may be made subsequent to adjudication of the merits upon waiver by
the class opponent, Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 762 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). In class suits for injunctive or declaratory relief, the class deter-
mination may be made subject to the court's decision on the merits. See Roberts v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 526 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976).
28 Strict compliance with the requirements of rule 23 is required in order to maintain a
class suit. The failure to satisfy even one of the requisites is grounds for dismissal. See, e.g.,
Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 540 F.2d 699, 708-09 (4th Cir. 1976); Burns v. United
States Postal Serv., 380 F. Supp. 623, 629-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Bennett v. United States, 266
F. Supp. 627, 629 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
29 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see Smith v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 473 F. Supp. 572, 580-82 (D.
Md. 1979).
11 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
3' The date of certification marks the time when all class members must be given notice
of the institution of the suit, and invests an unnamed class member with the right to "enter
an appearance through his counsel," and to "opt out" of the class suit. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2). In addition, once the class is certified, any class judgment, whether or not
favorable, will be binding upon all the members of the class. See In re Four Seasons Sec.
Laws Litigation, 525 F.2d 500, 502-04 (10th Cir. 1975); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams &
Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 411-13 (2d Cir. 1975); Brown v. Housing Auth., 471 F.2d 63, 69 (7th Cir.
1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969); Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 99 (1966).
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ultimate substantive outcome of the case. 2 For example, in some
instances denial of class certification, in effect, may terminate the
plaintiff's claim because it is impracticable for him to proceed indi-
vidually.3 3 In addition, litigation strategy and settlement possibili-
ties may depend on the certification determination." Thus, an ef-
fective right of appeal from adverse class certification decisions is
of significant consequence to an aggrieved class-action plaintiff.
APPEALABILITY OF CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION DETERMINATIONS
The Rise and Fall of the Death Knell Doctrine
Section 1291 of Title 28 of the United States Code limits to
"final decisions" the district court determinations from which an
appeal may be taken as of right,35 in the absence of a specific stat-
utory grant to the contrary.36 The primary purpose of the restric-
32 See Cullen v. New York Civil Serv. Comm'n, 566 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1977); Jones
v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1095-97 (5th Cir. 1975); Handwerger v. Ginsberg, 519 F.2d 1339,
1341 (2d Cir. 1975); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 297-98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1968). Recognizing that the class certification ruling could be determinative of the
outcome of the case, the Second Circuit promulgated the death knell doctrine, which per-
mitted interlocutory appeal of class certification denials. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). See notes 35-51 and accom-
panying text infra.
"s The denial of class certification may make it economically prohibitive for the named
plaintiff to proceed individually since the cost of litigation may exceed the recovery on his
individual claim. Indeed, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967), the Second Circuit noted, "We can safely assume that no
lawyer of competence is going to undertake this complex and costly case to recover $70 for
[the named plaintiff]." Id. at 120-21. See Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 F.2d 1143,
1148 (6th Cir. 1975); Graci v. United States, 472 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 928 (1973). Where a class is certified, however, the potential class recovery will exceed
the litigation costs and hence make the named plaintiff's pursuit of the litigation more feasi-
ble. See Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
816 (1965); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 88-90 (7th Cir. 1941). See generally
Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 20.
34 See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 698 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
912 (1976); Comment, Appealability of Class Action Determinations, 44 FoRDH L. Rv.
549, 574-78 (1975); cf. Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action Alle-
gations, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1293-94 (1970) (denial of class certification forces named
plaintiff into a weaker bargaining position with the defendant).
-5 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976); see Johnson v. Combs, 471 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973); Donovan v. Hayden, Stone, Inc., 434 F.2d 619, 620 (6th Cir. 1970)
(per curiam); note 3 and accompanying text supra.
11 Examples of federal statutes that permit interlocutory appeal as of right include: 18
U.S.C. §§ 1404, 3731 (1976) (interlocutory appeals by the government from pretrial orders
suppressing evidence); 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (1976) (interlocutory appeals by criminal defen-
dants from denial of preconviction release orders); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(b) (1976) (interlocu-
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tion is to prevent the waste associated with fragmented appellate
review by disallowing appeal of any determination that is "tenta-
tive, informal or incomplete. '3 7 Although the concept of finality
defies precise definition,38 generally a final order may be catego-
rized as one which "fully and finally" determines the action.39
Since an order denying class certification is procedural in nature
40
and does not determine the merits of the controversy,41 it .is con-
tory appeal by government from order denying or suppressing wire or oral communications
monitoring); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) (1976) (interlocutory appeal of orders involving receiver-
ships); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (interlocutory appeal of orders determining rights and liabili-
ties of parties in admiralty cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(4) (appeal of judgment in patent
infringement cases which are final except for accounting). Implicit in such statutes is a legis-
lative balancing of the interests served by finality against the potential harm resulting from
delaying review until final judgment. See 16 WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & GREsSMAN, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURSDICTION § 3920, at 6-7 (1977). See generally Redish,
supra note 3; Comment, Collateral Orders And Extraordinary Writs as Exceptions to the
Finality Rule, 51 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 746 (1957).
"' Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515, 517 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 170-72 (1974); Markham v. Holt, 369 F.2d 940, 942 (5th Cir. 1966); Paliaga v. Lucken-
bach S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 403, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1962). Additional justification for the rule can
be found, however, in a desire to avoid judicial backlog in the federal appellate courts, see
Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEX. L. REV. 292, 293 (1966), in the pre-
vention of the delay that might be caused by allowing nonfinal orders to be appealed, see
Note, A Final Tolling of the Death-Knell: The Doctrine, Its Demise and Current Alterna-
tive Methods of Appeal of Class Certification Orders, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 668, 671 & n.21
(1979), and the avoidance of unnecessary tension between the district courts and the courts
of appeals, see id. at 671 & n.22 (citing Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 654 (2d
Cir. 1975)).
38 As the Supreme Court has stated, "No verbal formula yet devised can explain prior
finality decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an utterly reliable guide for the future."
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974). See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conver-
sion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950); McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536 (1892).
Professor Wright points out, however, that "[t]he saving grace of the imprecise rule of final-
ity is that in almost all situations it is entirely clear, either from the nature of the order or
from a crystallized body of decisions, that a particular order is or is not final." C. WIGHT,
FEDER L COURTS § 101, at 305. See Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L.
REv. 351, 354 (1961). See also Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 108 (1967) (Black, J.,
concurring); Redish, supra note 3, at 90. See also Freeman v. Califano, 574 F.2d 264, 266-67
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F.2d 678, 680 (2d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 698 (1943).
39 Beebe v. Russell, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 283, 284 (1866). See Republic Natural Gas Co. v.
State of Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 68 (1948); Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 543, 546
(1947); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). See generally 9 J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 110.06, at 106 (1980).
40 See Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 62 F.R.D. 466, 472-73 (E.D. Pa. 1974); In re Penn
Central Securities Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1343-44 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified, 357 F.
Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974). See generally Hazard, The
Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307 (1973).
" See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974); Miller v. Mackey Int'l,
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cededly nonfina 42 and seemingly subject to the general proscrip-
tion of interlocutory appeals.43 Nevertheless, not long after the re-
vision of federal class action procedures in 1966, an exception to
the final-judgment rule of section 1291, the death knell doctrine,
was fashioned by the judiciary in an attempt to balance the com-
peting interests underlying the general federal prohibition against
interlocutory appeals and the policies which gave rise to the estab-
lishment of class actions. The doctrine was promulgated in the
seminal case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin," wherein the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit was presented with the question
of whether a party could appeal as of right a district court order
which dismissed his class action, but allowed him to proceed with
his individual claim.45 Weighing the conflicting interests of "the in-
Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1971).
42 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978); accord, Williams v. City of
New Orleans, 565 F.2d 874, 874-75 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); West v. Capitol Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 558 F.2d 977, 981 (10th Cir. 1977); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 551
F.2d 531, 532-33 (2d Cir. 1977); Domaco Venture Capital Fund v. Teltronics Serve., Inc., 551
F.2d 508, 509 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d
1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259,
1260 (7th Cir. 1973); Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972); Walsh v. City of Detroit, 412 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1969).
4S It is the general rule that before an aggrieved party may appeal from a decision of a
federal trial court, there must have been entered an order which brought an end to the
litigation on the merits, leaving "nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see Kappelmann v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
539 F.2d 165, 167-68 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977). The federal courts
have held that a class certification determination- generally is not a decision on the merits
and that even if class certification is denied, the named plaintiff may still proceed with the
litigation of his individual claim. See Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 553 F.2d 714, 718 (1st Cir.
1977); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 645 (2d Cir. 1974); Siebert
v. Northern Dev. Co., 494 F.2d 510, 511 (5th Cir. 1974).
44 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
5 370 F.2d at 119. The named plaintiff in Eisen brought an action in federal district
court alleging that the defendants, "odd lots" dealers on the New York Stock Exchange, had
violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 119-20. Eisen, whose individual claim was for seventy dol-
lars, sought to bring the suit on behalf of a class of similarly situated "odd-lot purchasers
and sellers on the Exchange." Id. at 120. On motion by the defendants, the district court
denied class certification and dismissed the class suit on the grounds that the named plain-
tiff could not fairly and adequately represent the class and that common class issues were
absent. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 150-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). Eisen, however, was permitted to continue with his
individual claim. 370 F.2d at 120.
The Second Circuit acknowledged that in general only final orders may be appealed, id.;
see 28 U.S.C. § 1291; notes 3, 36 and accompanying text supra, but noted that there were
exceptions and limitations to this rule. 370 F.2d at 120. In this regard, the court cited 28
U.S.C. § 1292 (1976), wherein the legislature had enumerated several types of nonfinal or-
ders from which appeal may be had. 370 F.2d at 120. The court also observed that the
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convenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the
danger of denying justice by delay on the other," the Second Cir-
cuit ruled that, on the facts presented, the balance tipped in favor
of granting immediate appeal,4 6 since a denial of immediate review
would "for all practical purposes terminate the litigation.' "7 Thus,
the court held: "where the effect of a district court's order, if not
reviewed, is the death knell of the action, review should be
allowed. 4
The exception to the general rule against interlocutory appeal
promulgated in Eisen, commonly called the "death knell" doc-
trine,49 found acceptance among a number of circuits.50 Since it al-
lowed immediate appeal of orders denying class certification, the
doctrine was a very attractive tool to aggrieved plaintiffs and not
concept of finality under section 1291 had been distinguished from "the last order possible
to be made," thus allowing appeals from class certification denials where there seemed to be
little chance of the suit continuing. 370 F.2d at 120 (quoting Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964)).
46 370 F.2d at 120. In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit purported to apply the
"collateral order" doctrine. Id.; see notes 74-77 and accompanying text infra. It appears,
however, that in construing the requirement of finality practically rather than technically,
the court went beyond the scope of that doctrine.
7 370 F.2d at 121.
48 Id.
49 See Note, A Final Tolling of the Death Knell: The Doctrine, Its Demise and Cur-
rent Alternative Methods of Appeal of Class Certification Orders, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 668,
670, 674-680 (1979); Note, Civil Procedure-Appealability of Interlocutory Orders Denying
Class Certification-The Supreme Court Sounds the Death Knell for the Death Knell Doc-
trine, the Collateral Order Doctrine, and Appeals Based on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), 27 U.
KAN. L. REV. 529, 532-33 (1979); Case Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Deny-
ing Class Certification: Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay and Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad-
casting Co., 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 441, 445-47 (1979); 49 Miss. L.J. 973, 978-81 (1978).
'o See Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106, 1112 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub
nom. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Share v. Air Properties Inc., 538
F.2d 279, 281-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923 (1976); Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing
Co., 518 F.2d 1143, 1146-48 (6th Cir. 1975); Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215, 1223 (8th Cir.
1973); Gosa v. Securities Inv. Co., 449 F.2d 1330, 1332 (5th Cir. 1971); Korn v. Franchard
Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1304-06 (2d Cir. 1971). Not all circuits embraced the death knell con-
cept, however. Several courts of appeals held that the class certification determination was
reviewable only after final judgment. See Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363, 369-71 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975); King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259,
1260 (7th Cir. 1973); Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
Interestingly, at a later stage of the Eisen litigation, the Supreme Court reviewed the
history of the case without comment, causing some to believe that it ultimately would en-
dorse the death knell doctrine. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161-69
(1974); Note, A Final Tolling of the Death-Knell: The Doctrine, Its Demise and Current
Alternative Methods of Appeal of Class Certification Orders, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 668, 674-75
(1979). But see Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
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surprisingly was frequently employed in class-action litigation.51
The decisions in which it was applied evinced judicial awareness of
the significance and necessity of a meaningful right of appeal from
an order denying certification of the class. The doctrine, however,
was not long lived. In 1978, the Supreme Court in Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay5 2 sounded the death knell of the death knell
doctrine.
In Livesay, suit was brought alleging a violation of the federal
securities laws. 3 The named plaintiffs, who claimed that they had
purchased securities in reliance on a defective prospectus, sought
to represent a class of purchasers of the securitiesM The district
court at first certified, but later decertified the class.5 5 On the
plaintiff's appeal of this decision,58 the Eighth Circuit, applying the
death knell doctrine, held that it had jurisdiction to hear the ap-
peal.57 The United States Supreme Court, however, unanimously
reversed the court of appeals decision, expressly rejecting the
death knell doctrine.5 8
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens expressed
disapproval of a judicially engrafted exception to the finality re-
quirement under which "appealability turns on the court's percep-
51 E.g., Share v. Air Properties, Inc., 538 F.2d 279 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923
(1976); Hartman v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973); Graci v. United States, 472 F.2d
124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973). Subsequent to Eisen, the Second Circuit
developed the "reverse death knell" doctrine, which in certain instances permitted a defen-
dant to appeal a district court order granting class certification. See Herbst v. International
Tel. & Tel. Co., 495 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (2d Cir. 1974).
52 437 U.S. 463 (1978), rev'g Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir.
1977).
53 437 U.S. at 465-66.
Id. at 465. The plaintiffs claimed that they had incurred a loss of $2,650 on their
investment in the securities of Punta Gorda Isles, Inc. Coopers & Lybrand was the account-
ing firm that had certified the financial statements in the allegedly defective prospectus and
thus, was named as a defendant. Id.
55 Id. at 466.
" The plaintiffs did not continue to a final judgment on their individual claim. Nor did
they seek a discretionary appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). Rather, they sought
to appeal immediately as of'right. 437 U.S. at 466.
57 550 F.2d 1106, 1112 (8th Cir. 1977).
58 437 U.S. at 476-77. Prior to reaching the death knell issue, the Court initially deter-
mined that a class certification ruling was nonfinal since it did not constitute "a decision by
the District Court that 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to
do but execute the judgment."' Id. at 467 (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229,
233 (1945)). Moreover, at the outset, the Court found that an order granting or denying
class certification did not fall within the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 468-69; see notes
74-77 and accompanying text infra.
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tion of th[e] impact [of a certification decision] in the individual
case."59 It is not proper, the Court reasoned, for the judiciary to be
required to base appealability on its perception of whether a
"plaintiff has adequate incentive to continue" with his individual
claim. 0 Additionally, the Court found that it could not approve of
the death knell doctrine, since it "authorize[d] indiscriminate in-
terlocutory review of decisions made by the trial judge," and thus,
would defeat the statutorily established scheme allowing a limited
right of appeal from interlocutory orders."
Remaining Methods of Interlocutory Appeal
Both the reasoning and the result of the Livesay decision have
been strongly criticized.6 2 It has been suggested, for example, that
the decision effectively leaves remediless the wide range of plain-
tiffs for whom the denial of class certification is, for all practical
purposes, final judgment.6 Indeed, although there remain several
methods of interlocutory appeal other than the death knell doc-
trine, each of these alternatives has failed to provide adequate as-
surance of a meaningful right of appeal for aggrieved class-action
11 437 U.S. at 470-71. The Court, although admitting that the class action is to some
extent a "special kind of litigation," found that the absence of special provisions regarding
appealability in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicated that "[tihe appealability of
any order entered in a class action is determined by the same standards that govern appeal-
ability in other types of litigation." Id. at 470.
1o Id. at 471. In the course of rejecting the death knell rule on the grounds that it
required the trial judge to subjectively assess the prospects of the plaintiff continuing the
action in his individual capacity, the Court stated that it is the function of the legislature
and not the judiciary to permit appeal based on the size of the named plaintiff's claim. Id.
at 472. In noting that finality is the prerequisite to appealability, the Court held that basing
finality on the plaintiff's monetary claim, absent legislative enactment, is "arbitrary," for
such a consideration does not examine the other factors influencing the named plaintiff to
proceed on his own behalf. Id. The Court listed factors such as the plaintiff's "subjective
willingness" to continue suit, the intervention of other parties, and the possibility of reversal
of the certification denial upon appeal after final judgment. Id. at 470-71 n.15.
11 Id. at 474 (emphasis in original). In particular, the Court posited that to permit in-
terlocutory appeal as of right would be to circumvent the restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1976), which authorizes discretionary appeal from nonfinal orders only in exceptional cir-
cumstances. 437 U.S. at 474-75. The Court termed this possibility of circumventing the pro-
cedures of section 1292(b) "[p]erhaps the principal vice of the 'death knell' doctrine." Id. at
474.
" See Cohen, "Not Dead But Only Sleeping": The Rejection of the Death Knell Doc-
trine and the Survival of Class Actions Denied Certification, 59 B.U.L. REv. 257, 265-66,
269, 273, 279-81 (1979); Note, A Final Tolling of the Death Knell: The Doctrine, Its Demise
and Current Alternative Methods of Appeal of Class Certification Orders, 28 DRAKE L.
REv. 668, 683 (1979); Case Comment, supra note 49, at 441-43.
'3 See Cohen, supra note 62, at 267-73; Case Comment, supra note 49, at 464-73.
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plaintiffs.
1. Statutory Appeal As of Right From Certain Nonfinal Orders
Section 1292(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code enumer-
ates specific interlocutory orders from which appeal may be had as
of right." This statutory list of exceptions to the rule of finality is
based on the policy of granting an aggrieved party a right of appeal
where such a right is necessary to challenge effectively the order
and where the order is of serious, and perhaps irreparable conse-
quence.6 5 Class action certification determinations, however, are
not among the particularized orders named in section 1292(a).6
2. Discretionary Appeal
Section 1292(b) provides for the discretionary appeal of inter-
locutory orders.8 7 Before appeal is permitted under this section,
" 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1976); see notes 65-66 infra.
,5 Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955). See generally C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 102 (3d ed. 1976).
" Although orders granting or denying class status are not specifically mentioned in
section 1292, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976), a split among the circuits has developed as to whether
a class certification denial in an action seeking injunctive relief would be immediately ap-
pealable under section 1292(a)(1) as an order refusing an injunction. Compare Williams v.
Wallace Silversmiths, Inc., 566 F.2d 364, 365 (2d Cir. 1977) and Williams v. Mumford, 511
F.2d 363, 366 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975) (denial of class certification is not
an order refusing an injunction within the meaning of § 1292(a)(1)) with Smith v.
Merchants & Farmers Bank, 574 F.2d 982, 983 (8th Cir. 1978) and Jones v. Diamond, 519
F.2d 1090, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1975) and Price v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 501 F.2d 1177, 1179 (9th
Cir. 1974) and Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1364-66 (1st Cir. 1972) and Brunson v. Board
of Trustees, 311 F.2d 107, 108-09 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933 (1963) (denial of
certification is appealable under § 1292(a)(1)). The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978), however, indicates that
there is no right to an immediate appeal under § 1292(a)(1) from an order denying class
certification in an action seeking injunctive relief. In Gardner, the Supreme Court held that
on the facts presented, interlocutory appeal from such an order was not warranted, since the
order was fully reviewable both before and after judgment and, therefore, did not pose a
threat of irreparable injury necessary to obtain interlocutory review under the statute. Id. at
480-82. See generally Case Comment, supra note 49; Comment, Civil Proce-
dure-Interlocutory Appeal of Negative Class Action Determination Denied Under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)-Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 31 RuTGuPs L. REv. 106
(1977). Notably in Gardner, a companion case to Livesay, the Court did not indicate the
basis for obtaining review of a certification denial prior to final judgment. Presumably, the
Court was alluding to the possibility of obtaining discretionary interlocutory review under
section 1292. See generally Deposit Guaranty Natl Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336 n.8
(1980). Generally, however, plaintiffs seeking immediate review of a class certification ruling
under this section have not been successful. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text infra.
67 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) states:
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however, both the district court and the appellate court must agree
that review is warranted."8 The statute requires initially that the
district court judge certify that the case "involves a controlling
question of law" and that "immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 9
Only then, upon proper application by the aggrieved party, may
the court of appeals in its discretion permit the appeal.70 Although
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appeala-
ble under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a control-
ling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opin-
ion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be
taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry
of the order: Provided, however, that application for an appeal hereunder shall not
stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of
Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). See generally Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal
Courts Under U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARv. L. REv. 607 (1975). By expediting review of orders
that in all likelihood would be appealed after final judgment, section 1292(b) "not only
save[s] protracted litigation, but with its built-in safeguards, prevent[s] numerous and
groundless appeals to. . .appellate courts." H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Seas. 1, 2
(1958).
-8 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). Though the district court may certify an order for inter-
locutory appeal, the appellate court is not bound to certify the appeal. See Katz v. Carte
Blanche, 496 F.2d 747, 754 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S 885 (1974); Johnson v. Alldredge,
488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974); Gialde v. Time, Inc.,
480 F.2d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1973).
6" 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). The first requirement of the statute is that there must be
a controlling question of law. See Katz v. Carte Blanche, 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); United States Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 784-85 (9th
Cir. 1966) (per curiam); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 474 F. Supp. 589, 592-94 (D. Conn.
1979). The courts have held, however, that the requirement is not satisfied if the order
merely involves a procedural matter that can be accommodated by the judgment. See City
of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1964); Gottesman v. General
Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 196 (2d Cir. 1959); Kroch v. Texas Co., 167 F. Supp. 947, 949
(S.D.N.Y. 1958). Furthermore, there must also be a substantial difference of opinion as to
the legal issue involved. See Fallon v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 1320, 1322-23 (D. Mont.
1976); In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litigation, 380 F. Supp. 880, 888 (D. Mo. 1974).
Finally, the order under review must result in a material advancement of the litigation. See
United States for Use and Benefit of Joseph Marion Bldg. Corp. v. Dember Constr. Corp.,
600 F.2d 11, 11-12 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
498 F.2d 1240, 1246, rehearing denied, 504 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
992 (1975); Hodgson v. United States Slicing Mach. Co., 370 F.2d 565, 567 (3d Cir. 1967).
This requirement merely reflects the policy that interlocutory appeal should not delay the
litigation. See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 844, 845 (2d Cir. 1964)
(per curiam); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975);
First Delaware Valley Citizens Television, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 917, 924-25 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
1- 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). See FED. R. APP. P. 5.
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at first blush section 1292(b) appears to offer promise to a class
action plaintiff who has been denied certification by the trial court,
the policies underlying the statute and the prerequisites to appel-
late review contained therein render it largely ineffective in such
context. 1 Indeed, courts generally have been reluctant to construe
a class certification determination as involving a controlling ques-
tion of law72 or to find that immediate review of such determina-
tion would hasten the conclusion of the litigation. 3
3. Collateral Order Doctrine
The collateral order doctrine is a judicially promulgated device
by which a party may have an immediate right of appeal from cer-
71 The judiciary's limited utilization of section 1292(b) reflects the legislative intent
that certified interlocutory appeals should be restricted to exceptional cases so as not to
permit appeal in the ordinary case which would result in congesting the appellate dockets
and unduly lengthening the litigation process. See Spinetti v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 552
F.2d 927, 929-30 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977); Fisons Limited v. United States, 458 F.2d
1241, 1248 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 1111, 1120-21 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in [1958] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. Naws 5256-57, 5260-63.
72 Since a certification ruling made within the rule 23 guidelines is deemed discretion-
ary and procedural, utilization of section 1292(b) as a basis for interlocutory appeal of certi-
fication denials cannot be consistently relied upon. See Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North
America, Inc., 550 F.2d 860, 862-63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); Arth Main
Street Drugs v. Beer Distributors of Indiana, Inc., 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 91, 92 (N.D. Ind.
1978). But see Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336 n.8 (1980) ("In
some cases [a § 1292(b)] appeal would promise substantial savings of time and resources or
for other reasons should be viewed hospitably."); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747,
755-56 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (section 1292(b) should be
liberally construed and in some cases may be applicable to review of class certification
denials).
7' See Gelman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 556 F.2d 699, 702 (3d Cir. 1977); Lamphere
v. Brown Univ., 553 F.2d 714, 718-19 (1st Cir. 1977); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 75 F.R.D. 727, 738-39 (N.D. n11. 1977). One reason for the judiciary's reluctance to
permit certified interlocutory appeal of class status determinations is that such a ruling may
be revised or vacated by the district court during the course of the litigation. See Link v.
Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 550 F.2d 860, 862-63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
933 (1977). In certain instances, the Second Circuit has refused to review class rulings
brought under section 1292(b). See Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 574
F.2d 656, 659-61 (2d Cir. 1978). It appears that only in exceptional cases will the courts
permit interlocutory review of the certification denial. See Sullivan v. Pacific Indem. Co.,
566 F.2d 444, 445-46 (3d Cir. 1977); Katz v. Carte Blanche, 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); Caceres v. International Air Transport Assoc., 422
F.2d 141, 142-44 (2d Cir. 1970). See generally Note, A Final Tolling of the Death-Knell:
The Doctrine, Its Demise and Current Alternative Methods of Appeal of Class Certifica-
tion Orders, supra note 37, at 685-86 (1979); Note, Immediate Appealability of Orders De-
nying Class Certification: Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay and Gardner v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., supra note 49, at 467 (1979).
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tain district court orders that are not final in the traditional sense,
yet are sufficiently final to satisfy the congressional intent of sec-
tion 1291. In order to be appealable under this exception to the
rule of finality, the order in question "must conclusively determine
the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely sepa-
rate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable
on appeal from a final judgment."74 In the case that first recog-
nized the doctrine, for example, immediate appeal was allowed
from a district court order denying application of a state statute
requiring a deposit of security for costs in a federal diversity suit
on the grounds that such determination, distinct from the merits
of the controversy, would escape effective review if appeal was
forestalled pending final judgment.75 Although no doubt it can be
argued by analogy that an adverse certification decision, because it
frequently results in the termination of the litigation, may escape
review if a right to immediate appeal is not recognized, it is settled
that in such context the collateral order doctrine may not be em-
ployed to circumvent the statutory prohibition of interlocutory ap-
peals. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Livesay, in addition to re-
jecting the death knell doctrine, itself an outgrowth of the
collateral order doctrine, e made it clear that an order denying
class certification is not an order separable from and collateral to
"' Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
71 In Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546, the wellspring of the col-
lateral order doctrine, a shareholder derivative suit based on diversity jurisdiction was
brought alleging a conspiracy of "mismanagement and fraud" by officers of the corporation.
Id. at 543-44. The suit was brought in New Jersey, where a state statute was in force requir-
ing the plaintiff in a shareholder derivative suit to post a $125,000 bond and be liable for the
defendant's litigation costs, if the plaintiff lost. Id. at 544-45. After the district court held
that the statute was inapplicable to federal actions, the defendant sought interlocutory re-
view. 7 F.R.D. 352, 356 (D.N.J. 1947). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, after
initially finding the order immediately appealable, 170 F.2d 44, 49-50 (3d Cir. 1948), re-
versed on the merits, id. at 58. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and as a preliminary
matter to its review of the merits, determined that the order was "a final disposition of a
claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consid-
eration with it." Id. at 546-47. Thus, noting that the statute should be given a "practical
rather than a technical construction," the Court held that such an order was immediately
reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. See generally Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 328 (1940); United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 414 (1926).
7" The collateral order doctrine provided the impetus for the federal courts to recognize
the interlocutory appealability of certain class action orders which conceivably could jeop-
ardize the adjudication of the suit if immediate appealability were denied. See Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967);
notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
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rights asserted in the action within the meaning of this exception."
4. Mandamus
Section 1651(a) of Title 28 permits a federal court to issue "all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [its] jurisdiction and agree-
able to the usages and principles of law."78 Under this statute it is
possible for a court of appeals to issue a writ of mandamus di-
recting the trial court to change its ruling.7 9 Petition for the writ
may be made despite any allegation of the nonfinality of the
order.80
The probability of obtaining a writ of mandamus to overturn
an adverse certification ruling, however, appears slight. Since the
writ is intended to be used only in exceptional circumstances,81 it
77 437 U.S. at 468-69. In determining that the collateral order doctrine was inapplicable
to class certification denials, the Livesay Court noted that the certification ruling was "in-
herently tentative," since rule 23(c)(1) permits the trial court to "alter or amend" the class
status prior to adjudication of the merits. Id. at 469 & n.11. Thus, the class ruling does not
conclusively determine the issue. Secondly, the Court pointed out that the ruling on certifi-
cation may involve consideration of the merits, since the court may look at such factors as
typicality of claims or defenses, the ability of the named plaintiff to fairly and adequately
represent the class, and the commonality of law or fact questions. Id. These considerations
thus preclude the certification ruling from meeting the collateral order doctrine's require-
ment that the order be completely separate from the merits. Id. Finally, the Court noted
that since the certification ruling may be effectively reviewed by either the named plaintiff
or intervening class members after final judgment, the Cohen requirement that the order be
effectively unreviewable after final judgment is not met either. Id. at 469.
76 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976).
79 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 706-07 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Grace Lines, Inc. v. Motley,
439 F.2d 1028, 1031 (2d Cir. 1971). The purpose of the mandamus writ, when utilized by an
appellate court in reviewing a district court's ruling, is to ensure that the district court has
not overextended the bounds of its legitimate discretionary power. See Kerr v. United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, 426 U.S. 394, 402-03 (1976);
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-98 (1967); Hospes v. Burmite Division of Whittaker
Corp., 420 F. Supp. 806, 809 (S.D. Miss. 1976).
80 Though "the power to issue [a writ of mandamus] is discretionary and it is sparingly
exercised," Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Scholes, 601 F.2d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1979); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 197-200 (D.C. Cir.
1979), the courts, in some instances, have permitted the writ of mandamus to be used as a
basis for interlocutory appeal. See United States v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 545 F.2d 869, 872
(3d Cir. 1976); American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California, 538 F.2d 1371, 1373-76 (9th Cir. 1976); Carrington, The Power of
District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507, 508-17
(1969); Comment, 52 CALF. L. REV. 1036 (1964). See generally Note, Supervisory and Advi-
sory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 HARv. L. REV. 595 (1973).
81 See In re Cessna Aircraft Distrib. Antitrust Litigation, 518 F.2d 213, 215 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975); Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers
Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 775 (2d Cir. 1972). As the Supreme Court stated, "[w]e are unwill-
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has been held that the writ should be granted only "when there is
a usurpation of judicial power or a clear abuse of discretion.""2
Since such a showing rarely is possible in the class action context,
the writ of mandamus appears to be yet another ineffective
method by which a class-action plaintiff may seek to obtain an im-
mediate appeal from an order denying class certification.83
THE PROBLEM OF FINAL JUDGMENT APPEAL
In its opinion in Livesay, the Supreme Court seemed uncon-
cerned that the result of its decision would be to preclude an ag-
grieved party from obtaining immediate appeal of class certifica-
tion determinations. Rather, the Court expressed confidence that
such determinations would obtain "effective review after final
judgment." 84 In a line of cases following the Livesay case, however,
it became increasingly apparent that appeal after final judgment
frequently did not provide "effective review" of the lower court or-
der. 5 In particular, the would-be class representative would not be
allowed to serve as representative of the class where his individual
cause of action became moot subsequent to the denial of class cer-
tification.86 This mootness generally occurred in one of three ways.
First, after a denial of class certification by the district court and
adjudication of the named plaintiff's individual claim, it became
ing to utilize [writs of mandamus] as substitutes for appeals ... [a]s extraordinary reme-
dies, they are reserved for really extraordinary cases." Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260
(1947). Though some courts have felt that the writ should be liberally applied, see Parkin-
son v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 655 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975); Hackett v. General Host Corp.,
455 F.2d 618, 624 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972), there has not been a consistent
trend with respect to this matter by the courts. Compare In re Attorney General of United
States, 596 F.2d 58, 62-65 (2d Cir. 1979); Citibank, N.A. v. Fullam, 580 F.2d 82, 86-87 (3d
Cir. 1978); Prop-Jets, Inc. v. Chandler, 575 F.2d 1322, 1324 (10th Cir. 1978); Banc Ohio
Corp. v. Fox, 516 F.2d 29, 32-33 (6th Cir. 1975) with Whitlock's Estate v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 547 F.2d 506, 510 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 916 (1977);
Drew v. Lawrimore, 380 F.2d 479, 483 (4th Cir. 1967); Schillinger v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 259 F. Supp. 29, 29 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
82 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964).
" See Bauman v. United States District Court, 557 F.2d 650, 653-62 (9th Cir. 1977);
Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868, 873-75 (8th Cir. 1977); Arthur Young & Co. v.
United States District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 697-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977).
84 437 U.S. at 469.
85 See notes 91-92 and accompanying text infra.
86 See generally Note, Satterwhite v. City of Greenville and Breathing New Life into
the Headless Title VII Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REV. 743 (1980); Comment, The Headless
Class Action: The Effect of a Named Plaintiff's Pre-Certification Loss of a Personal Stake,
39 MD. L. REV. 121 (1979).
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apparent that the putative class representative's cause of action
was without merit.e7 Alternatively, a named plaintiff's individual
claim could be mooted because of a judgment in his favor.8" Fi-
nally, the named plaintiff's claim could become moot due to some
occurrence distinct from the adjudicatory process.89
The problem posed by the mootness of the named plaintiff's
claim prior to appeal of the certification denial has not been uni-
formly handled by the federal judiciary. In some instances, courts
have found that the plaintiff could proceed with his appeal from a
district court denial of class certification notwithstanding the in-
tervening mootness of his individual claim.90 The majority of
courts, however, have found that such mootness prevents the puta-
tive class-action plaintiff from appealing an adverse certification
determination, either for lack of an article III case or controversy"
87 See Armour v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 46, 48-49 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated, 445 U.S.
940 (1980); Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (4th Cir. 1978); Shipp v. Ten-
nessee Dep't of Employment Security, 581 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 980 (1979); Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 992-96 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en banc), vacated, 445 U.S. 940 (1980); Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555
F.2d 270, 276-77 (10th Cir. 1977); Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853, 854-56 (4th Cir. 1973);
Note, Satterwhite v. City of Greenville and Breathing New Life into the Headless Title VII
Class Action, supra note 86, at 743; Comment, Goodman v. Schlesinger and the Headless
Class Action, 60 B.U.L. REV. 348, 348-61 (1980).
See McLaughlin v. Hoffman, 547 F.2d 918, 919 (5th Cir. 1977); Nelson v. United
Credit Plan, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 54, 56-58 (E.D. La. 1978).
8, E.g., Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238, 244-46 (3d Cir. 1978),
vacated, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (prisoner's challenge of federal parole guidelines mooted by
release from prison); Kuahulu v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334, 1336 (9th Cir.
1977) (employee's challenge of workmen's compensation plan mooted by administrative
award of relief sought); Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825, 826 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1049 (1977) (institutionalized juvenile's challenge of state juvenile detention stat-
ute mooted by her release from custody); Allen v. Likins, 517 F.2d 532, 533-35 (8th Cir.
1975) (prisoner's challenge of state statute making prisoner's children dependents of the
state mooted after her release). In some putative class suits, the defendants have attempted
to avert litigation on the merits by tendering payment of the named plaintiff's claim or
voluntarily ceasing the alleged wrongful conduct. See Susman v. Lincoln American Corp.,
587 F.2d 866, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); Roper v. Consurve,
Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1110-11 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); Banks v. Multi-Family Management, Inc., 554 F.2d 127, 128-29
(4th Cir. 1977); Bradley v. Housing Authority, 512 F.2d 626, 627-29 (8th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); Stokes v. Bonin, 366 F. Supp. 485, 487-88 (E.D. La. 1973).
90 See, e.g., Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1975); Conover v.
Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073, 1081-82 (3d Cir. 1973); Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159, 1163
(9th Cir. 1972); Frost v. Weinberger, 375 F. Supp. 1312, 1318-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
91 See, e.g., Allen v. Likins, 517 F.2d 532, 534-35 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Bradley
v. Housing Auth., 512 F.2d 626, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Locke v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 499 F.2d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 1974); McCleary v. Realty Indus., Inc., 405 F. Supp.
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or because the plaintiff was deemed no longer a suitable class rep-
resentative under rule 23.92 Whatever the grounds for decision,
these cases seriously limited the availability of a meaningful right
of appeal from district court orders denying class certification.
Roper AND Geraghty: THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES THE
PROBLEM OF THE MOOTNESS OF THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM
AFTER CERTIFICATION DENIAL
Recently, in two companion cases, Deposit Guaranty National
Bank v. Roper" and United States Parole Commission v. Ger-
aghty," the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the issue
of whether the mootness of the named plaintiffs' individual claim
subsequent to the denial of class status would deprive them of the
standing requisite to challenge that ruling. An examination of
these cases as well as their significance in more fully securing a
meaningful right of appeal for the putative class-action plaintiff
from adverse certification determinations follows.
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper: Named Plaintiffs Held
to Have Retained Personal Stake in Controversy Despite Satis-
faction of Individual Claims
The plaintiffs in Roper brought an action alleging that they
were charged usurious rates on their credit accounts with the de-
fendant.9 5 In addition to their individual claims, the plaintiffs
sought to assert, in a representative capacity by way of class ac-
tion, the claims of 90,000 similarly situated credit-card holders."'
The district court, however, denied the motion to certify the
128, 130 (E.D. Va. 1975); Huemann v. Board of Education, 320 F. Supp. 623, 624-25
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
92 See, e.g., Armour v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated, 445 U.S.
940 (1980); Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated, 445 U.S.
940 (1980); cf. East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977)
(in attempting to pursue class remedy "careful attention to the requirements of Rule 23
remains indispensable").
93 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
'4 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
9' 445 U.S. at 327-28. The plaintiffs premised their claim on sections 5197 and 5198 of
the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86 (1976) (amended 1979), alleging that the interest
charges on the credit accounts sometimes exceeded the maximum interest rate permitted by
law. Id. at 328-29.
" 445 U.S. at 328.
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class.9 7 After the plaintiffs' unsuccessful attempt to obtain interloc-
utory review pursuant to section 1292(b),9" the defendant tendered
as settlement the maximum amount that each named plaintiff
could have recovered.99 Although the plaintiffs did not accept the
offer, the district court entered judgment in their favor based on
the defendant's tender of payment.100
Subsequently, the Roper plaintiffs again appealed the denial
of class certification.101 Notwithstanding the defendant's conten-
tion that the case was mooted by the district court's entry of judg-
ment for the plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the denial of certification.0 2 The Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari to consider whether the tender or entry of judg-
ment rendered the plaintiffs' claims moot, thus precluding them
from seeking review of the certification ruling.10 3 Affirming the
Fifth Circuit, the Court held that the plaintiffs had a continuing
individual interest in the litigation that was sufficient to permit
the appeal of the adverse class certification determination. 04
The Roper majority recognized that, as a general rule, federal
appellate practice precludes a party from appealing a judgment in
his favor that fully satisfies his claim on the merits. 0 5 The Court
97 Id. at 329. The district court based its denial of class certification on the finding that
the requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) were not met because the plaintiffs failed to
establish that questions of law and fact common to class members predominated, and that
the class suit was not shown to be a "superior method" of adjudicating the claims. Id. at 329
& n.2.
98 Although the district court certified the case for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b) (1976), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to hear the appeal. 445
U.S. at 329.
" 445 U.S. at 329. The amounts tendered to the two named plaintiffs totaled $1312.96,
including court costs and interest at the statutory rate. Id.
100 Id. at 329-30.
, Id. at 330.
101 Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), af'd, 445 U.S. 326 (1980). In
concluding that the named plaintiff's individual claim was not moot, the Fifth Circuit relied
on the Supreme Court's decision in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
578 F.2d at 1110. In McDonald, the Court allowed an unnamed member of the putative
class to intervene after the named plaintiff, who had since recovered a judgment on her
individual claim, chose not to pursue an appeal from the district court's denial of class certi-
fication. 432 U.S. at 393-96.
103 See 440 U.S. 945 (1979).
10 445 U.S. at 327.
200 Id. at 333 (citing Public Service Comm'n v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 306 U.S.
204, 206 (1939) (per curiam); New York Tel. Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U.S. 645, 645 (1934); Corn-
ing v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 451, 464-66 (1854); 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 203.06 (2d ed. 1976)).
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carefully pointed out, however, that this rule does not derive from
the jurisdictional limitations of article III, but rather is a self-im-
posed restraint on the exercise of judicial power. The Court rea-
soned, therefore, that "[iun an appropriate case, appeal may be
permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on the
merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits,
so long as that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the
requirements of Art. lI."106 Applying this rule to the case before
it, the majority found that an adverse class certification ruling is
by nature collateral to the merits of the controversy 0 7 and that the
requisite personal stake in the controversy was satisfied by the
named plaintiffs' "desire to shift part of the costs of litigation" to
the putative class members who-if the class were certified and the
action successful-ultimately would share in the recovery.108 Thus,
the Court held that the denial of class certification was appealable
by the plaintiffs notwithstanding their success on the merits of
their individual claims.109 Indeed, the Court reinforced this conclu-
sion, noting that an important consideration in its refusal to allow
interlocutory appeal as of right from adverse class certification rul-
ings was the existence of a meaningful right of appeal after final
judgment. 10 Moreover, the majority concluded, to hold otherwise
would be to sanction the practice of "buying off" the plaintiffs' in-
o 445 U.S. at 334. It is important to note that the suggestion by the Roper Court that
certain collateral determinations may be appealable although a party has prevailed on the
merits is not prima facie inconsistent with the conclusion of the Court in Livesay that a
certification determination does not fall within the collateral order exception to the finality
rule, see generally notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra. The distinction, of course, is
that the Roper Court was addressing the constitutional case or controversy aspect of appeal-
ability, whereas the Court in Livesay was examining the statutorily imposed finality require-
ment. See generally notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
107 445 U.S. at 334. The Court cited its decision in Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas
& Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939) as an example of a previous instance where it had "per-
ceived the distinction between the definitive mootness of a case or controversy, which ousts
the jurisdiction of the federal courts and requires dismissal of the case, and a judgment in
favor of a party at an intermediate stage of litigation, which does not in all cases terminate
the right to appeal." 445 U.S. at 335 (footnote omitted).
108 Id. at 336-37. Although it is fundamental in this country that adverse litigants bear
their own attorney's fees, non-litigants who will share in a recovery obtained through the
efforts of a litigant can be compelled to contribute to the costs of suit under an equitable
device known as the common fund doctrine. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 481-82
(1980); Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1885); Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-37 (1882).
109 445 U.S. at 340.
110 Id. at 337-38 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978)); see
notes 52-61 and accompanying text supra.
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dividual claims in order to prevent appeal of the lower court's cer-
tification ruling.""
Notably, the decision in Roper appears to be a logical exten-
sion of prior Supreme Court decisions. The Court has recognized,
for example, that a defendant in a suit for injunctive relief ordina-
rily will not be able to moot the plaintiff's cause of action by vol-
untary cessation of the allegedly wrongful conduct." 2 In such cases
it has been reasoned that remedial conduct will not create an arti-
cle III obstacle to continuance of an action since absent an adjudi-
cation on the merits a "defendant is free to return to his old ways,"
and, furthermore, there is a public interest in resolving the legality
of the questionable practice. 1 3 Similar considerations, it is submit-
ted, support the decision in Roper.
Although the Roper Court confined its holding to the narrow
facts before it,"" thus apparently limiting its applicability only to
class actions for monetary relief where the defendants have at-
tempted by their own act to render the plaintiff's claim moot, the
decision nevertheless represents a significant step by the Court to-
ward ensuring the existence of a meaningful right of appeal from a
denial of class certification. Through a liberal interpretation of the
1 445 U.S. at 339. In a strong dissent, Justice Powell disagreed with the majority's
application of settled article III principles. Id. at 346 (Powell, J., dissenting). In particular,
the dissent rejected the majority's conclusion that the named plaintiffs were possessed of
the requisite personal stake by their desire to shift part of the litigation costs to members of
the putative class. Id. at 351 (Powell, J., dissenting). Such a personal stake, Justice Power
observed, was "conspicuously vague" where, in a case such as this, the named plaintiffs'
counsel were retained on a contingent fee basis. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Thus, he con-
cluded that the desire to shift fees was entirely speculative and "wholly irrelevant to the
existence of a present controversy" in the absence of an explanation of how the named
plaintiffs' "obligation to pay 25% of their recovery to counsel could be reduced if a class is
certified and its members become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery." Id.
(Powell, J., dissenting).
112 United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953); accord, County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631-33 (1979); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 489 F. Supp. 763,
767-68 (N.D. Miss. 1980). See generally L. TRne., supra note 7, at 66-67; see, e.g., Quincy
Oil, Inc. v. Federal Energy Administration, 620 F.2d 890, 894-95 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1980); Central Soya Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 614 F.2d 684, 687 n.6 (7th Cir. 1980);
Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 486 F. Supp. 187, 192 (E.D. Va. 1980).
n" United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953). See also Atlantic Rich-
field Co. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 447 F.2d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 1971).
The W.T. Grant Court noted, however, that voluntary cessation may cause mootness where
there is a "reasonable expectation" that the wrong will not reoccur. 345 U.S. at 633; see
United States v. Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968); United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d Cir. 1945).
114 See 445 U.S. at 332-33.
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case or controversy requirement of article III, the Supreme Court
has held for the first time that an aggrieved party may appeal an
adverse certification determination notwithstanding the expiration
of his individual claim-the constitutional requisites being satis-
fied by the plaintiffs' economic interest in distributing the costs of
the litigation among the putative class."' Significantly by not dis-
cussing the basis or merits of the Roper plaintiffs' attorneys' fee
claim, the Court has suggested that even the mere allegation of a
desire to shift fees will be sufficient to satisfy the continuing stake
requirement of article III.l""
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty: Named Plaintiff
Held Proper Party to Appeal Certification Denial Notwithstand-
ing Intervening Mootness of Individual Claim
John M. Geraghty, a prisoner in a federal penitentiary,
brought an action challenging the validity of federal parole release
guidelines. 117 Prior to trial, Geraghty sought to have certified a
class of plaintiffs composed of "all federal prisoners who are or
who will become eligible for release on parole."' ' s The district
court denied the certification motion and granted the defendant's
summary judgment request." 9 While his appeal from these rulings
was pending in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiff
was released from prison. 20 The defendants then moved to dismiss
Geraghty's appeal as moot.' 2' The Third Circuit, finding that the
claim was not moot, entertained the plaintiff's appeal from the ad-
verse certification determination and reversed the district court
-5 Id. at 340.
"I See note 111 and accompanying text supra.
117 445 U.S. at 390 (1980). Geraghty had been convicted of "conspiracy to commit ex-
tortion. . . and of making false material declarations to a grand jury." Id. at 391-92. After
two unsuccessful applications for parole, he brought an action alleging that United States
Parole Board Release Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979), were violative of the United
States Constitution and the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-
4218 (1976). 445 U.S. at 393.
11 445 U.S. at 393.
11 Id. The district court, which regarded Geraghty's suit as a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, found certification "neither necessary nor appropriate." Id. Moreover, reach-
ing the merits of the case, the district court upheld the guidelines as valid. Id. at 393-94.
120 Id. at 394. The plaintiff's release was mandatory, since he had served his full sen-
tence less time for which he had earned "good time" credits. Id.
"' Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238, 244 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated
and remanded, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
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ruling.122 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether a certification denial could properly be appealed notwith-
standing that the individual claim of the named plaintiff had be-
come moot, and ultimately held that such review would not contra-
vene article 111.123
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun acknowledged the
importance of the existence of a meaningful right of final judgment
appeal.1 24 As it had done in Roper, the Court found that a live
controversy existed as to the plaintiff's desire to achieve class certi-
fication notwithstanding that Geraghty's individual claim had be-
come moot.1 25 Indeed, the majority noted, the class suit presents
two legal controversies-the issue on the merits and the named
122 579 F.2d at 252-54. Addressing the threshold question of whether the plaintiff could
appeal the denial of certification, the Third Circuit reasoned that since expiration of Ger-
aghty's individual claim would not have rendered the controversy moot if a class had been
certified at the trial level before his release, "an erroneous denial of a class certification
should not lead to an opposite result." See 445 U.S. at 394. Thus, the court of appeals held
that subsequent certification of such a class would relate back to the time of the district
court denial, thereby preserving jurisdiction. Id.
123 445 U.S. at 390, 407.
12 Id. at 400.
121 Id. at 404. In support of its conclusion that the case was not moot, the Court sur-
veyed other cases in which it had occasion to consider the "personal stake" requirement of
article III in the class action context. Id. at 397-401. First the Court observed that in Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), it had held that once a class had been certified, the suit will
continue notwithstanding the subsequent mootness of the named plaintiff's individual
claim, id. at 400. 445 U.S. at 397. Thus, the Sosna decision made clear "that an Art. III case
or controversy 'may exist. . . between a named defendant and a member of the class repre-
sented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become
moot.'" 445 U.S. at 397-98 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 402 (footnote omitted)).
Second, citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court stated that the timing of the
certification should not be crucial. 445 U.S. at 398. In Gerstein, the Court permitted an
appeal on the merits in a class action challenging a state's pretrial detention procedures
notwithstanding that the detention had ended prior to a final adjudication on the merits.
Noting that the nature of the detention was such that it could end before an adjudication on
the merits, or before any named plaintiff could obtain class certification, the Court held that
the appeal was not moot under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to
the finality doctrine. 420 U.S. at 110 n.11. Thus under this exception, it is possible for a
class action to continue despite the fact that the named plaintiff's claim became moot prior
to certification.
Finally, the majority cited United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977),
where the Court held that a putative class member could intervene after the named plain-
tiff's personal claim became moot, by virtue of a judgment on the merits. 432 U.S. at 393-95;
see 445 U.S. at 400. Concluding that these cases and the Court's decision earlier that day in
Roper demonstrated the flexible character of the article III mootness doctrine, 445 U.S. at
400, the Court determined that Geraghty retained a sufficient personal stake in class certifi-
cation to appeal an adverse certification determination notwithstanding the mootness of his
individual claim on the merits. Id. at 407.
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plaintiff's right to represent the class. Since the certification denial
remained a "concrete, sharply presented issue," the Court held
that the case or controversy requirement of article III was
satisfied.12 6
Although the Supreme Court decision in Geraghty yielded the
same result achieved in Roper-the named plaintiff was allowed to
appeal the denial of class certification notwithstanding that his in-
dividual claim subsequently became moot-the Geraghty holding
appears far more pervasive than Roper. Notably, the majority
opinion in Geraghty spoke in much broader terms than had been
used in Roper. Rather than insisting on the importance of the facts
before it, the Court seemingly established a general right of appeal
from adverse class certification denials despite any allegations of
the mootness of an individual's personal claim. 11 7 In addition, the
Geraghty decision extended the flexible reading of article III to
suits for equitable relief as well as for damages. 128 More impor-
tantly, however, the Court declined to limit its earlier decision to
instances where mootness resulted from affirmative action on the
part of the defendant. In Geraghty, the Supreme Court found no
difference between mootness caused by "expiration" of the individ-
ual claim and a favorable judgment-induced mootness, ruling that
"Geraghty's 'personal stake' in the outcome of the litigation is, in a
practical sense, no different than that of the putative class repre-
sentative in Roper.'12 9 The Court's express refusal to distinguish
between the continuing interests of the named plaintiffs in Roper
and Geraghty is perhaps the most significant aspect of the deci-
sion. In Roper, the Court found a continuing individual interest
satisfying the article III case or controversy requirement in the
named plaintiff's desire to shift attorney's fees to the other mem-
126 445 U.S. at 403-04. As in Roper, Justice Powell authored a lengthy dissenting opin-
ion. Id. at 409-424 (Powell, J., dissenting); see note 113 supra. Analyzing prior decisions, the
dissent challenged the correctness of both the majority decision that the article III personal
stake requirement be applied flexibly, 445 U.S. at 409-19 (Powell, J., dissenting), and the
Court's specific holding that Geraghty satisfied that requirement, id. at 419-24 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
12 In Roper, the Court suggested that mootness was avoided because the continuing
economic interest possessed by the plaintiffs-the desire to shift attorney's fees-kept alive
the controversy on the merits. 445 U.S. at 332-33. In Geraghty, on the other hand, the Court
stated that the plaintiff's interest in the merits was distinct and separable from his interest
in obtaining class certification, and that the mootness of the claim did not deprive him of
the personal stake requisite to appealing the denial of certification. 445 U.S. at 402.
128 See 445 U.S. at 393.
12, Id. at 401.
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bers of the class.1 0 A similar economic interest, however, was not
present in Geraghty. Rather, in the latter case, the Court analo-
gized the would-be representative's interest to a "private attorney
general's" interest in achieving class certification. 131
Previously, the Court had suggested that where the named
plaintiff's claim expired prior to certification, resort to the fiction
of relation back might be one way in which to find the personal
stake requisite to pursuing class certification.1 32 The employment
of this fiction, the Court had cautioned, was appropriate only
where the issue was capable of repetition but evading review."3" Al-
130 Id. at 336.
131 Id. at 403.
,' In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), the Court held that where the plaintiff's indi-
vidual claim became moot subsequent to certification, the class claim could be continued
provided that the named plaintiff's claim was viable at the time the complaint was filed and
at the time of certification, and also that at every stage thereafter a live controversy existed
between a member of the class and a named defendant. Id. at 402. With respect to the
requirement that the named plaintiff possess a viable claim at the time of certification, how-
ever, the Court qualified its statement in a footnote stating:
There may be cases in which the controversy involving the named plaintiffs is
such that it becomes moot as to them before the district court can reasonably be
expected to rule on a certification motion. In such instances, whether the certifica-
tion can be said to "relate back" to the filing of the complaint may depend upon
the circumstances of the particular case and especially the reality of the claim that
otherwise the issue would evade review.
Id. at n.11.
133 Id. at 402 n.11. The possibility that the validity of the Parole Release Guidelines
might evade review was not present in Geraghty since the plaintiff's attorney candidly con-
ceded that were the Court to declare the case moot, he would simply reinstitute a similar
action on behalf of other parties whose interests would outlast the litigation. 445 U.S. at 414
n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The potential that an issue might recur and yet evade review, which the Sosna Court
indicated might justify a fictional relation back of the grant of certification, has been em-
ployed frequently by the Court to determine whether the continued prosecution of a certi-
fied class action was precluded by the intervening mootness of the named plaintiff's cause of
action. In Sosna, the Court held that where the issue was capable of repetition, yet evading
review with respect to any member of the certified class, a justiciable controversy was
presented, and thereby justified the continued prosecution of the action notwithstanding the
expiration of the putative class representative's claim. Id. at 401-02. Subsequently, in Board
of School Commissioners of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam), the
Court appeared to elevate the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" element to the
status of an article I requirement to continuation where the claims of the named plaintiff
had become moot. Indeed, the Jacobs Court stated:
The case is therefore moot unless it was duly certified as a class action pursuant to
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, a controversy still exists between petitioners and the pre-
sent members of the class, and the issue in controversy is such that it is capable
of repetition yet evading review.
Id. at 129 (emphasis added). In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), how-
ever, the Court retreated from the position seemingly espoused in Jacobs, stating that
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though noting the existence of this fiction, however, the Geraghty
Court did not invoke such reasoning.' Rather, it based its finding
on the plaintiff's continuing interest in obtaining class certifica-
tion.1"' The wellspring of this interest, however, is nowhere dis-
cussed. Indeed, on close inspection, it appears that the Court ac-
knowledged the existence of a right to obtain class certification
which survives the expiration of the individual claim that origi-
nally served as the predicate under rule 23 for the institution of
the class action.13 6 The practical import of such a rule, at least
with respect to certification appeals, is to render virtually indefea-
sible a valid article III interest present at the inception of the ac-
tion and to allow a named plaintiff to bootstrap his way into an
appeal of the certification denial.
CLASS-CERTIFICATION APPEALS AFTER Roper AND Geraghty
Although the Court has apparently made the relation back
fiction absolutely applicable for the purpose of satisfying the case
or controversy requirement, 3 7 it should not be presumed that the
liberalization of the constitutional standard will facilitate the ap-
peal of class certification rulings in all cases. For parties aggrieved
by such rulings, the conjunctive requisite to appealability-final-
neither Sosna nor Jacobs held or even intimated that where the named plaintiff's claim had
become moot, the existence of an issue capable of repetition yet evading review was the
absolute prerequisite to the continuation of the class suit. Id. at 754. More recently, the
Court has reiterated that position, noting that the "capable of repetition yet evading re-
view" element "was one factor to be considered in evaluating the adequacy of the adversary
relationship in this Court." Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 133 (1977).
1'3 See 445 U.S. at 398-405.
135 Id. at 402-04.
131 It is beyond dispute that the statutory prerequisites to certification contained in
rule 23(a) require that the substantive issues presented and the claims and defenses to be
raised by the named plaintiff "typify" those of the absent class members. Indeed, rule
23(a)(2) imposes the requirement that common questions of law or fact exist, and subsection
(a)(3) requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be] typical of the
claims or defenses of the class." FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(a)(2), (3). It is submitted that it is theo-
retically unsound to suggest that, wholly apart from any substantive claim giving rise to
such commonality and in the absence of the exceptional circumstances found in Sosna, see
note 132 supra, a party possesses the right to seek to qualify a class to pursue a remedy to
which he is no longer entitled. Moreover, Justice Powell observed in his dissent in Geraghty
that by granting standing to a party who concededly has no substantive interest in the con-
troversy, the decision portended a relaxation of the Court's previously strict stance regard-
ing privately litigated "public actions." See 445 U.S. at 421-22 (Powell, J., dissenting). See
generally Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
137 See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
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ity-remains a difficult hurdle to surmount."' 8
At least with respect to the typical consumer class action, one
result of the relaxation of the article III barrier to appealability is
sure to be the refusal of the putative class defendant to settle with
the named plaintiffs after certification has been denied. Clearly, in
Roper, it was just such an attempt to satisfy the claims of the pu-
tative class action representative, under the guise of a nuisance
settlement, which when judicially enforced gave rise to the plain-
tiffs' right to appeal the certification ruling. In the absence of the
defendant's tender-the very act which mooted the plaintiffs' indi-
vidual claims-there is no doubt after Livesay that the plaintiffs
would have been precluded from appealing the certification denial
as of right for want of a final judgment.189 By holding, however,
that an attempted "buy out" of the named plaintiffs will not de-
prive them of the standing to contest the validity of a class certifi-
cation denial1 40 and, moreover, will provide the finality requisite to
such appeal, the Court as a practical matter has reversed the oper-
ation of the in terrorem effect of a class-action judgment.141 Where
previously it appeared to be in the defendant's interest to attempt
to satisfy the individual claim of the named plaintiff so as to de-
prive him of the capacity142 as well as the incentive to appeal a
11 See note 3 and accompanying text supra. Notably, the Court in Roper gave some
indication that attempts to obtain review of certification denials pursuant to section 1292(b)
should be viewed more favorably. See 445 U.S. at 336 n.8.
13' See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
110 445 U.S. at 339-40.
"4 The grant of class certification, which raises the specter of ruinous liability, often
operates to coerce the defendants into settlement notwithstanding their probability of suc-
cess on the merits. See AMaRIcAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERs, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CWvi PROCEDURE
15-17 (1972). In this context, Professor Handler has called the class suit a "form of legalized
blackmail." Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971). The
Second Circuit, recognizing that "these cases are settled even though the validity of the
plaintiff's claims are doubtful," devised a reverse death knell doctrine, permitting class-ac-
tion defendants to appeal as of right the grant of class certification. Herbst v. International
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (2d Cir. 1974).
142 Where the named plaintiff's claim has become moot by virtue of the defendant's
tender of payment or cessation of wrongful conduct prior to certification, some courts have
refused appellate review of the class certification denial. See Banks v. Multi-Family Mgmt.,
Inc., 554 F.2d 127, 128-29 (4th Cir. 1977); Bradley v. Housing Auth., 512 F.2d 626, 627-29
(8th Cir. 1975). In Bradley, for instance, although the Eighth Circuit noted that prior to
certification "the defendants deliberately mooted the issue as to the named plaintiffs or
intervenors to avoid judicial review," the court still dismissed the suit on mootness grounds.
Id. at 628-29. Indeed, since the Supreme Court had stated that "it is only a 'properly certi-
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class certification denial, after Roper a class defendant's best tacti-
cal posture apparently is to do nothing, thereby forcing the named
plaintiff to litigate his individual claim on the merits in order to
obtain a final judgment from which appeal of the certification rul-
ing is possible.14 3 Indeed, class action defendants now have every-
thing to lose and nothing to gain by attempting to reach an accord
with the named plaintiffs subsequent to the denial of class status.
Clearly, however, not all putative class representatives will be
unable to satisfy the finality requirement.1" By not discussing the
issue, however, Geraghty implicitly suggests that where a nonjudi-
cial occurrence is the cause of the mootness of the plaintiff's indi-
vidual claim, the resulting dismissal will constitute the requisite
final judgment from which the certification appeal may be taken.145
In such instance, of course, the relaxation of the strictures of arti-
fled' class that may succeed to the adversary position of a named representative whose claim
becomes moot," Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1977); see Vun Cannon v. Breed,
565 F.2d 1096, 1098-1101 (9th Cir. 1977); Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d
271, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978), prior to Roper and Geraghty,
a class-action defendant had a tenable expectation that by mooting the named plaintiffs'
claims he could prevent them from obtaining class certification and thus possibly avoid class
suit.
143 See generally Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
144 The entry of judgment in favor of the putative class adversary will generally satisfy
the Livesay finality requirement for purposes of appellate review of the certification denial.
See, e.g., Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 274-75 (10th Cir. 1977);
Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 36, 42-43 (5th Cir. 1974); Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853, 854-55
(4th Cir. 1973).
"I Nowhere in the Geraghty opinion is the finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1976) even mentioned. In contrast, where the dismissal is the result of the plaintiff's ac-
tions, such as a failure to prosecute, the courts have refused to permit appeal of the certifi-
cation denial, holding that such a dismissal is an attempt by the plaintiff to circumvent the
policy of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). In Huey v. Teledyne, 608 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1979), for
example, the plaintiff made no appearance at trial after the district court denied his motion
for class certification. The district court dismissed the case for want of prosecution and,
thereafter, the plaintiff appealed the denial of class certification under section 1291. Id. at
1236. Citing to Livesay, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[j]ust as the policy against piecemeal
appeals precludes the appeal of an order denying class certification-even where that may
sound the 'death knell' of an action-so it precludes review of that order from a proper
dismissal for failure to prosecute which results from that order." Id. at 1239. The court
further noted that when the plaintiff fails to prosecute the suit after the denial of class
certification, "that ruling does not merge in the final judgment for purposes of appellate
review." Id. at 1240. See also Marshall v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917, 918 (3d Cir. 1974). Recently,
in Bowe v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors, 613 F.2d 798 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 2989 (1980), the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed Huey, noting that "[t]he Supreme Court's
decision in [Livesay] was a positive one which does not tolerate creation of a loophole by the
simple device of allowing the claim of a class representative to be dismissed for lack of
prosecution." 613 F.2d at 801.
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cle III wrought by the Supreme Court is of profound significance
to the named plaintiff. Certainly where finality does not constitute
a significant impediment to appealability, and where the plaintiff
has at least a facially tenable individual claim at the time the ac-
tion was commenced, the decision in Geraghty will permit him to
seek appellate review of the certification ruling notwithstanding
the status of his individual claim at the time finality is established.
A more difficult problem, however, is presented by a situation
in which finality is clearly not an obstacle to appealability-where
prior to certification the plaintiff's claim is mooted by an adverse
judgment on the merits.4 While neither Roper nor Geraghty ad-
dressed this situation, it would appear that the virtual emascula-
tion of the case or controversy requirement would apply without
regard to the cause of the mootness of the plaintiff's claim and
hence would not, of itself, preclude appealability. As the Supreme
Court has noted, however, the disposition of the mootness issue
does not end the inquiry, but rather shifts its focus to whether the
putative class representative satisfies the stringent requirements of
rule 23.147 In this regard, it is settled that the determination of
148 The effect upon a putative class suit where the named plaintiff's individual claim is
deemed meritless has not been resolved uniformly by the federal courts. The Fifth Circuit,
for instance, has held that in such circumstances the suit will be dismissed unless the named
plaintiff had a sufficient nexus with the class so as to satisfy rule 23(a)(3). See Armour v.
City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 46, 48-50 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated, 445 U.S. 940 (1980); Camper v.
Calumet Petrochemicals Inc., 584 F:2d 70, 71-72 (5th Cir. 1978); Satterwhite v. City of
Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), vacated, 445 U.S. 940 (1980). The
necessity that the plaintiff have a "nexus" with the putative class was derived from East
Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977), where the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he mere fact that a complaint alleges [wrongful conduct] does not in itself
ensure that the party who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate representative of
those who may have been the real victims of that [conduct]." Id. at 405-06. The Fourth
Circuit and some lower courts, however, have permitted class suits to continue, notwith-
standing a determination that the plaintiff's claim lacked merit. See Goodman v. Schles-
inger, 584 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (4th Cir. 1978); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 16
(4th Cir. 1972); La Reau v. Manson, 383 F. Supp. 214, 218-19 (D. Conn. 1974); Taylor v.
Springmeier Shipping Co., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1233, 1234 (W.D. Tenn. 1971). In Goodman,
for example, the court deemed the named plaintiff's claim meritless, but in light of evidence
that a class controversy might exist, remanded the suit to the district court in order to
permit a putative class member to intervene and argue the certification issue. 584 F.2d at
1331-33. See generally Comment, The Headless Class Action: The Effect of a Named
Plaintiff's Pre-Certification Loss of A Personal Stake, supra note 86, at 151-63; Note, Sat-
terwhite v. City of Greenvile and Breathing New Life into the Headless Title VII Class
Action, 32 STAN. L. REv. 743 (1980). Notably, the Supreme Court has vacated Armour and
Satterwhite for further consideration by the Court of Appeals. Satterwhite v. City of Green-
ville, 445 U.S. 940 (1980); Armour v. City of Anniston, 445 U.S. 940 (1980).
10 See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 405-07 (citing Sosna v.
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whether the named plaintiff may adequately represent the class
where class status is not granted at the outset of the litigation "is
appropriately made on the full record, including the facts devel-
oped at the trial of the plaintiff's individual claims. ' 148 It is sub-
mitted that where the adjudication that the would-be representa-
tive's claims were meritless reflects his lack of nexus to the injured
class and not the validity of the cause of action shared by the class,
the adverse individual judgment militates against allowing the pu-
tative class representative to contest the denial of certification. 149
On the other hand, the expiration of the plaintiff's individual claim
for reasons other than an adverse determination on the merits, for
example a nonjudicial occurrence, seemingly should not indi-
cate-at least for the purpose of appealing the certification de-
nial-the undesirability of his continued representation of the
class.1
50
Iowa, 419 U.S. at 403).
148 East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 406 n.12 (1977). In
focusing on the requirement of fair and adequate representation, Rodriguez recognized that
in some civil cases a named plaintiff may represent the putative class notwithstanding the
lack of merit in his individual claim. Id.
Proper representation is a crucial element to the class action, and the courts have
stressed that the representative's interests must coalesce with those of the absent class
members. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 503 F.2d 459, 463-64 (10th Cir.
1974); Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112, 1116-17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
826 (1970). As one court has stated, "[b]ecause members of the class are bound-even
though they may not actually be aware of the proceedings-by the judgment in a Rule 23
action unless they affirmatively exercise their option to be excluded, the requirement of
adequate representation must be stringently applied." Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic In-
dus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98, 103 (D. Colo. 1971). See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45
(1940); Comment, The Class Representative: The Problem of the Absent Plaintiffs, 68 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1133 (1974).
10 Rule 23(a)'s requirement that the class representative have an interest common with
the class does not appear to be met when the named plaintiff's claim is rendered meritless
and there is no nexus between the plaintiff and the class. See Shipp v. Tenn. Dep't of Em-
ployment Security, 581 F.2d 1167, 1172 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979);
Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), vacated, 445
U.S. 940 (1980); Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Moss v. Lane Co., 471
F.2d 853, 855-56 (4th Cir. 1973). Furthermore, the ability of the named plaintiff to represent
the putative class is critical to appellate review, for in its absence the court "need not reach
the issue whether the plaintiff has the requisite standing to sue." Satterwhite v. City of
Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 991 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), vacated, 445 U.S. 940 (1980).
150 Where the named plaintiff's claim has expired for reasons other than an adjudica-
tion on the merits, it appears that the named plaintiff has a sufficient typicality of interest
with the putative class so as to be capable of appealing the certification denial. See United
States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404-07; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 402-03;
McGill v. Parsons, 532 F.2d 484, 488-89 (5th Cir. 1976); Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d
1073, 1081-82 (3d Cir. 1973); Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1972).
APPEAL OF CERTIFICATION DENIALS
CONCLUSION
Despite its coercive potential, the class action frequently con-
stitutes the only viable means to redress injuries which, although
suffered by a large number of persons, when measured individually
against the time, effort, and expense of the litigation would prove
economically insubstantial. In large part because the in terrorem
effect of a class judgment often induces a defendant to settle the
action, even where he might reasonably expect to prevail on the
merits, judicial aversion to the class suit is often manifest. Indeed,
one notable example of this has been the strict application of the
final decision rule of section 1291, mandated by the Supreme
Court in Livesay, to prevent interlocutory review of class certifica-
tion denials. Nevertheless, because finality continues to present a
formidable obstacle to the maintenance of class suits, recent Su-
preme Court decisions allowing appeal of certification rulings by
parties whose individual claims have become moot evince a judicial
unwillingness to erect further barriers to the maintenance of class
suits. While these decisions, by focusing on the constitutional as-
pect of appealability, have left Livesay unaffected, they nonethe-
less appear to indicate that Livesay is the high watermark of the
pro-class defendant decisional law and, indeed, may portend an
eventual retreat from that decision. Until such time, however, the
finality requirement continues to be a pervasive impediment to ap-
pellate review. Roper and Geraghty, therefore, can be expected to
advance only marginally the realization of a meaningful right of
review for parties aggrieved by an adverse class certification ruling.
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